Recovering AES Keys with a Deep Cold Boot Attack. (arXiv:2106.04876v1 [cs.CR])

Cold boot attacks inspect the corrupted random access memory soon after the
power has been shut down. While most of the bits have been corrupted, many
bits, at random locations, have not. Since the keys in many encryption schemes
are being expanded in memory into longer keys with fixed redundancies, the keys
can often be restored. In this work, we combine a novel cryptographic variant
of a deep error correcting code technique with a modified SAT solver scheme to
apply the attack on AES keys. Even though AES consists of Rijndael S-box
elements, that are specifically designed to be resistant to linear and
differential cryptanalysis, our method provides a novel formalization of the
AES key scheduling as a computational graph, which is implemented by a neural
message passing network. Our results show that our methods outperform the state
of the art attack methods by a very large margin.